Th is article is part of a larger project to analyse the rarely-considered gender aspects of the crime of aggression and to explore whether or not the amendments adding the crime of aggression to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) represent an advancement for women. Th is piece focuses on the potential for the new provisions to chill bona fi de exercises of humanitarian intervention given that (1) the crime is expansively drafted to potentially cover all uses of sovereign force, (2) delegates rejected eff orts by the United States to include an express exception for military operations launched to prevent the commission of other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and (3) other proposals that would have prevented humanitarian interventions from being considered 'acts of aggression' were not fully explored or implemented. Th e article acknowledges that feminist theory may never fully come to terms with a notion of humanitarian intervention given the doctrine's valorisation of militarism, especially in light of the fact that women are so often excluded from decisions about uses of force. It nonetheless argues that if we want to hold out the possibility of humanitarian intervention being deployed in defence of women, elements of the new provisions (such as the terms 'manifest', 'character', 'gravity', and 'consequences') should be interpreted to exclude situations involving the nascent responsibility to protect doctrine.
Introduction
Any feminist defence of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention must take as its starting point the recognition that the substantial denial of women's rightswhether civil, political, economic, social, or cultural -has never served as the sole or primary basis for military intervention.
1 Advocating the deployment of humanitarian intervention on behalf of women requires an acceptance of the legitimacy, if not lawfulness, of the use of armed force without Security Council approval.
2 Th is, in turn, requires a coming to terms with a certain valorisation of militarism and its inherent masculinities -a perspective that is alien to much feminist thinking. Nonetheless, while women remain under the threat of mass violence, we should not foreclose ongoing eff orts to develop a workable doctrine of humanitarian intervention to prevent the commission of grave crimes that are subject to prosecution before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the event of Security Council political paralysis or inaction.
If we hold out the possibility that humanitarian intervention might someday be deployed to protect women from the ravages of war and gender-based violence, we should be concerned about the threat of over-deterrence posed by the new provisions on the crime of aggression 3 recently added to the ICC Statute.
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Th e crime of aggression is expansively drafted in a way that implicates all uses of force that might be construed to constitute a 'manifest' violation of the U.N. Charter. Whereas the concept of self-defence has a Charter basis 5 and is relatively well established under international law, the right to use force in defence of others is more contested. As a result, the codifi cation of the crime of aggression and the eventual threat of prosecution may chill those uses of force that are protective in nature, such as interventions pursuant to the nascent doctrine of responsibility to 1) See Christine Chinkin, 'A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force', 12 Australian Year Book of International Law (1988-89) 290 ("Oppression and acts of brutality towards women have never been regarded in the same light as slavery, genocide and apartheid"); see also ibid. , p. 291 ("Th e invisibility of women in any legal justifi cations for the use of force is striking."). protect. 6 Such uses of force do not directly implicate sovereign prerogatives in the way that other uses of force of questionable legality -such as acts of pre-emptive/ preventative self-defence or military responses to acts of terrorism -might. For this reason, humanitarian uses of force may be more susceptible to processes of deterrence. Th e potential for over-deterrence should be a concern for those of us working to enhance the ability of international law to improve women's lives and protect them from abuse.
With the drafting process behind us, whether or not the Court will hear aggression cases involving humanitarian interventions now depends on the attitudes of members of the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Council -which are empowered to refer situations to the Court -as well as the discretion of the Prosecutor. During the aggression negotiations, the United States delegation endeavoured to create a space in the defi nition of aggression to argue the legality of bona fi de humanitarian interventions.
7 Th e most pointed proposals of the United States were ultimately not implemented. Th ere is language, however, in the fi nal resolution adopting the aggression amendments that should be interpreted by these actors to exempt bona fi de humanitarian interventions from prosecution as the crime of aggression. More and more, we all confront diffi cult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suff ering can engulf an entire region. I believe that force can be justifi ed on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. 
See

Deconstructing the Crime of Aggression
References to sex and gender pervade the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), not only in its substantive law, but also in its structures and procedures. In particular, the ICC Statute contains an expansive list of gender crimes in the war crimes and crimes against humanity provisions.
8 Persecution on the basis of gender -along with ethnicity or race -is penalized.
9 Th e defi nition of genocide in Article 6 mirrors that of the Genocide Convention, but the Elements of Crimes -drafted to assist the ICC in interpreting its substantive off enses -note that "serious bodily or mental harm" "may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment". 10 In terms of personnel, the ICC Statute requires states parties to choose judges and other staff with experience with "violence against women or children" 11 and calls for "fair representation of female and male judges".
12 Th e ICC Statute also contains a non-discrimination provision stating that the ICC's application and interpretation of the law must be consistent with internationally recognised human rights and be without adverse distinction founded on, inter alia , gender.
13
Th ese provisions in the ICC Statute are the result of the intense and coordinated advocacy work of a coalition of women's groups, then called the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice, which was active during the drafting of the ICC Statute.
14 To achieve these provisions, the Caucus had to overcome signifi cant resistance from a handful of states and non-governmental delegations -including the Holy See, several anti-choice organizations, and a core of Islamic states -that were less sympathetic to the imperative of gender justice. 15 Th ough gender played 8) Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the ICC Statute specifi cally designate the crimes of rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, and other forms of sexual violence as war crimes whether committed in international or non-international armed confl ict. Th e same crimes are listed as crimes against humanity. ICC Statute, supra note 4, Art. 7(1)(g). Enslavement as a crime against humanity is also defi ned with reference to the traffi cking of women and children. Ibid. , Art. 7(2)(c). Law (2008) a central role in the negotiations surrounding other aspects of the ICC Statute, there was no mention of gender in the recent negotiations to add the crime of aggression to the ICC Statute and little involvement by non-governmental organisations focused on advancing the interests of women worldwide. Instead, the negotiations were dominated by states with sovereign agendas as varied as alternatively preserving or eroding the power of the Security Council in international relations. 16 As a result of the recently-concluded negotiations, the crime of aggression has been defi ned as follows:
Article 8 bis Crime of aggression 1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime of aggression" means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position eff ectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, "act of aggression" means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression.
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Th e defi nition then provides a list of "acts of aggression" (such as invasion, bombardment etc.) drawn verbatim from Article 3 of General Assembly Resolution 3314, the instrument that was meant to guide the Security Council in exercising its U.N. Charter-based duties to respond to breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Th e amendments thus defi ne two phenomena -a crime of aggression, set out in subsection 1 of the Article, and an act of aggression, set out in subsection 2. Th ese two inquiries will generally be considered in reverse order such that the act of aggression committed by a state serves as a predicate for the prosecution of an individual for the crime of aggression. Th us, an individual will be held liable for the crime of aggression only when he or she plans, prepares, initiates, or executes one or more acts of aggression through the machinery of a state. Only those acts of aggression that by their "character, gravity and scale" constitute 1 (discussing role of activists in negotiations to ensure the ability to prosecute sex crimes within the statutes of the international criminal law tribunals). a "manifest violation" of the Charter, viewed objectively, can give rise to the crime of aggression.
Needless to say, it would be a singular achievement if the codifi cation and prosecution of the crime of aggression were able to reduce the incidence of confl ict in the world and give real content to the 'right to peace' that would improve the lives of so many women.
18 And yet, there is a risk that codifi cation of the crime of aggression may result in more ex post prosecutions of leaders launching aggressive campaigns at the expense of ex ante eff orts to halt threatened or ongoing violence. 19 A number of elements of the aggression amendments implicate the concept of humanitarian intervention -a fact not lost on delegates during the negotiations. Delegates could have framed the defi nition to more expressly leave open a space for exempting humanitarian intervention from prosecution. But very few such proposals were seriously considered, let alone adopted. Most importantly, delegates rebuff ed several eff orts by the United States to explicitly preserve a right to engage in truly humanitarian intervention and instead favoured more implicit language to this eff ect. Th e result is that the various organs of the Court will enjoy considerable discretion in dealing with such scenarios. 
Exempting Humanitarian Interventions
Once it began participating in the negotiations in November 2009, the United States took the position that the defi nition of aggression under consideration was fl awed and that the apparent consensus on the elements of the crime masked signifi cant disagreements regarding what types of sovereign conduct could constitute the crime of aggression. By the time of the Kampala Review Conference, it was clear that delegates were loath to reopen negotiations over the defi nition, especially at the behest of a latecomer. As a result, the U.S. delegation endeavoured to address perceived problems through a series of 'Understandings' to preserve an opening for claims about the legality of humanitarian interventions and Th e United States' eff ort to make explicit reference to a right of humanitarian intervention in the Understandings failed when delegates rejected the following proposed language:
It is understood that, for purposes of the Statute, an act cannot be considered to be a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter unless it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith, and thus an act undertaken in connection with an eff ort to prevent the commission of any of the crimes contained in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of the Statute would not constitute an act of aggression.
As an alternative, the United States sought other interpretive language focused on gravity and purpose to more indirectly preserve the ability of states to engage in humanitarian interventions.
Resolution 3314
One angle was to tether the defi nition of aggression more closely to Resolution 3314, adopted by the General Assembly by consensus in 1974. 22 Although supporters of the current defi nition touted its Resolution 3314 pedigree, the amendments depart from that instrument in subtle yet signifi cant ways. Most importantly, both Resolution 3314 and the U.N. Charter 23 envision a continuum of unlawful uses of force, only some of which rise to the level of aggression. Th e ICC defi nition, by contrast, is susceptible to a reading that every violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as well as violations of a state's "sovereignty" is 21) Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, made the following intervention in Kampala:
Although we respect the considerable eff ort that has gone into the Princeton Process [the intersessional aggression negotiations], we believe that without agreed-upon understandings, the current draft defi nition remains fl awed. We are concerned that the apparent consensus on the wording of Article 8bis masks sharp disagreement on particular points regarding the meaning of that language that must be addressed before the amendments on the crime of aggression can enter into force. an "act of aggression". Echoing language from Resolution 3314's preamble, the United States managed to attain a formal Understanding to the eff ect that "It is understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force . . .". 24 In addition, the United States successfully advocated the adoption of an Understanding that reads:
[A] determination whether an act of aggression has been committed requires consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
Identifying a "Manifest" Violation of the U.N. Charter
Only those acts of aggression that constitute a "manifest" violation of the U.N. Charter will give rise to a prosecution for the crime of aggression. Th e term "manifest" in Article 8(1), which was never defi ned, emerged as a compromise term that bridged the positions of two sets of delegates. One camp wanted no threshold at all. Th is position was premised on the theory either that every act of aggression should be subject to prosecution, or that only "the most serious crimes of international concern" would be prosecuted before the ICC. 25 In the other camp were delegates that sought a higher threshold to limit prosecutions to "fl agrant" breaches of the U.N. Charter, wars of aggression, "unlawful" uses of force, or acts of aggression geared toward occupying or annexing territory. Any one of these qualifi ers -with the exception perhaps of "fl agrant" -might have made it less likely that individuals engaged in bona fi de humanitarian interventions would be prosecuted for the crime of aggression.
Th e United States succeeded in raising the threshold on the term "manifest" slightly with an Understanding that states:
It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the three components of character, gravity and scale must be suffi cient to justify a "manifest" determination. No one component can be signifi cant enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself.
Given the degree of variation in states' preferences, the term "manifest" remains ambiguous: to some, the word refers to the degree of legal clarity surrounding the state's conduct; to others, the word denotes some level of seriousness (in terms of the impugned act's scale or consequences) or wilfulness. Th e focus on "consequences" in the Understandings allows for an opening to argue that a military operation that may have violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as a technical matter might not be deemed to constitute an act of aggression by virtue of the 24) All the understandings appear in Annex II of Resolution RC/Res.6, supra note 17. 25) ICC Statute, supra note 4, Art. 1. fact that it ultimately improved the situation on the ground by protecting civilians and vulnerable groups from further attack.
Purpose and Intent
One avenue for creating an opening for humanitarian interventions that was not fully explored would have been to tinker with the mens rea element of the crime of aggression with respect to the defi nition of the "crime of aggression". 26 As it stands, the defi nition of "crime of aggression" contains a combination intention/ knowledge-of-fact formulation: the defendant must intend to commit an enumerated act of aggression and must have knowledge of the factual circumstances that render the act a manifest violation of the Charter (e.g., the absence of Security Council authorisation or the absence of a prior attack by the putative victim state). Th e defendant need not, however, have knowledge of the applicable legal doctrine concerning the use of force. If drafters in Kampala had followed reasoning from some Nuremberg-era jurisprudence 27 and required proof of a heightened mental state implying some illicit purpose behind the actions -such as a specifi c intent or motive element or some showing of bad faith, malice, wilfulness, or hostile intent -they might have provided a textual basis for distinguishing bona fi de from pretextual humanitarian interventions.
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In the alternative, delegates could have added some notion of motive or intentionality to the defi nition of the state act of aggression, bearing in mind the diffi culty of attributing an 'intention' to an artifi cial entity like a state. For example, the United States suggested that the Court be directed to consider the state's "purpose" for using force when determining whether an act of aggression had been committed, which would have provided a potential opening to argue for the legality of humanitarian interventions. Alternatively, along the lines of a prior but abandoned German proposal, "act of aggression" could have been defi ned with reference to the wilfulness or hostile intent behind a governmental policy. In the In the High Command Case , the tribunal stated that the lawful or unlawful character of a war turns on its purpose: "Whether a war be lawful, or aggressive and therefore unlawful under international law, is and can be determined only from a consideration of factors that entered into its initiation. In the intent and purpose for which it is planned, prepared, initiated, and waged is to be found its lawfulness or unlawfulness. alternative, the defi nition could have listed a series of prohibited purposes, such as conquest, establishing a military occupation in the victim state, launching a war of aggression, achieving the annexation of the other state's territory, acquiring the other state's material resources, undermining the political independence of the state, or violating a state's neutrality. None of these proposals was adopted, and so the purpose behind a particular use of armed force can be considered only with reference to the terms character, gravity, and scale.
Character, Gravity and Scale
Under the provisions ultimately adopted, the only way for any party to address potentially unlawful but nonetheless legitimate uses of force is with reference to the tripartite factors of character, gravity, and scale. Drafters did not consider how these factors should be defi ned, leaving it to the Court for interpretation. Both gravity and scale, while not entirely synonymous, refer to the severity, magnitude, and consequences of a particular use of force. Indeed, both scale and character are arguably components of gravity that cannot really be assessed independently. Th e term "character", as a more qualitative term, is the most elastic of the three factors and might provide an opening to argue that an act of aggression was not committed with hostile intent or for aggressive purposes.
Particularised Defences
Finally, delegates could also have subjected the crime of aggression to special justifi cations or excuses. Negotiators did not, however, seriously consider amending the ICC Statute provisions addressing available defences. As it stands, individual defendants under indictment for the crime of aggression can invoke all of the existing defences -subject to whatever adaptations are necessary -set out in the ICC Statute. In particular, Article 31(1) provides that a defendant may be exonerated if he is acting in self-defence, in the defence of others, or under duress. Subparagraph (1)(c) -the only provision that implicates the crime of aggression directly -states: "Th e fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this subparagraph". Th us, neither self-defence nor the defence of others is automatically proven in situations in which the defendant is acting on behalf of a state engaged in self-defence, presumably within the terms of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 29 Delegates could have added a provision to 29) Th is provision states: "Th e fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this subparagraph".
allow more clearly for a consideration of whether the state's use of force was motivated by the defence of others. Article 31 is addressed to individual defences and does not easily accommodate 'defences' that might be raised by the putative aggressor state at the stage in the proceedings at which the state act of aggression is under consideration. Indeed, it is unclear procedurally whether either the impugned state or the putative victim state will have standing to participate in the aggression determination absent amendment to the ICC Statute or Rules of Procedure. 
Chilling Humanitarian Intervention in Th eory and Practice
It remains to be seen whether and how the adopted Understandings will impact on the travaux préparatoires or infl uence prosecutions before the Court in light of their uncertain legal authority. 31 Some delegations supported the content or impulse behind the rejected Understandings, but deemed them unnecessary or superfl uous; others expressed concerns as to their very content. Many were sympathetic to the idea that humanitarian interventions should not be prosecuted as the crime of aggression, but preferred to grant the Court discretion in this regard. Given this ambiguous record, it will be for the various organs and constituencies of the ICC -including the Prosecutor exercising prosecutorial discretion and the Pre-Trial Division fi lter -to determine how to address future humanitarian interventions. By virtue of this delegation of interpretive authority, the ICC is thus poised to play a role as arbiter on the legality of humanitarian interventions. Th e variety of meanings of the term 'manifest' coupled with the nuances contained in the Understandings provide tentative grounds for bona fi de humanitarian interventions to avoid scrutiny by the Court under the rubric of the crime of aggression.
Nonetheless, because the crime is expansively and ambiguously defi ned, the potential exists for the new aggression provisions to chill arguably benefi cent uses of force that lack Security Council approval, such as: multilateral, regional, or unilateral peacekeeping missions and humanitarian interventions; rescue operations; or even (more controversially) military responses to acts of terrorism that might incapacitate terrorist organisations and prevent future attacks. Humanitarian interventions may be more susceptible to being chilled than other uses of force of ambiguous legality. Bona fi de humanitarian interventions are discretionary and often do not directly implicate sovereign prerogatives as do actions compelled by an extension of a right of self-defence. Th e risk of chilling the exercise of such an 'imperfect duty', if it can even be called that, is thus greater.
32 Indeed, even in the face of a horrifi c genocide, the international community found a host of excuses for not intervening more robustly in Rwanda. Th e codifi cation of a crime of aggression without any humanitarian exception provides one more excuse for inaction in the face of atrocities. To be sure, creating a penal forum to judge uses of force may discourage states from undertaking pre-textual humanitarian interventions. At the same time, the way in which the crime of aggression as been codifi ed might also derail creative thinking geared toward establishing universal standards and designing institutions to manage interventions and protect against abuses.
33 Th e international community must continue its work on the responsibility to protect doctrine with an eye toward establishing standards that the Court can employ in making the predicate aggression determination in the face of arguably humanitarian uses of force.
Intervening on Behalf of Women
For those of us concerned about augmenting international law's ability to protect women, should we care about over-deterring humanitarian interventions and other uses of force that do not constitute an a hostile attack or rise to the level of aggressive war? It is unlikely that feminist thinkers will ever universally come to terms with the idea of a just war. 34 To be sure, many feminists have fought for more robust forms of intervention in confl ict zones where women were at risk. United States to mobilise Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Although the plight of women under the Taliban was not a prime motivator for the intervention, the rhetoric surrounding the intervention appropriated feminist concerns about the quality of women's lives under Taliban rule to garner the support of domestic and international constituencies for the Operation. 37 Indeed, the propaganda value of violence against women has long been recognised. 38 To date, preventing harm to women has served only as a convenient makeweight argument in the service of interventions initiated for other rationales.
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To be sure, interventions have been launched or considered in situations that have featured grave violations of women's rights. Th at said, interventions that did go forward have not necessarily benefi ted women across the board. It is now clear that women in Afghanistan have not necessarily fared better following the partial ouster of the Taliban. 40 Nor were the women of Kuwait liberated along with their country by Operation Desert Storm. 41 Even in Kosovo, where NATO's intervention halted an ethnic cleansing, the introduction of foreign troops occasioned a dramatic increase in sex traffi cking and forced prostitution. Many strains of feminism -whether based on an affi rmative essentialism borne of biological reductionism or premised on theories of diff erential socialisation and social constructivism -are closely tied to pacifi sm in rejecting the masculinist impulse to resort to arms in the face of confl ict. 43 Th e temptation to invoke armed intervention in the face of atrocities may limit the ability of the international community to imagine, design, and implement other non-violent forms of confl ict resolution. 44 While ostensibly protective, humanitarian interventions threaten more violence, at least in the short term (if not longer). 45 Such operations valorise militarism and entail the deployment of armed force capable of causing great destruction, injuring civilians, and devastating societies. Doing so in the name of humanitarianism or even in the defence of women does not negate the harm caused to civilians who become collateral damage or are violently displaced. Th e idea of humanitarian intervention in defence of women also furthers the vulnerable victim narrative by portraying women as in need of a heroic male saviour. 46 Th at said, anyone who is the innocent victim of violence deserves to be rescued from her predicament, and encouraging women to exercise their autonomy and agency is simply folly when they are looking down the barrel of a gun. 47 Despite these concerns with part practice, it is possible to envision a benefi cial humanitarian intervention on behalf of women. Ancient 48 and modern just war theories suggest some elements that would be required for any valid intervention. 49 Factors often mentioned include: action by a legitimate authority; pursuit of a right intention (the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil); abuses that exceed some gravity threshold; the use of force as a last resort after eff orts at diplomacy, negotiation and other sanctions had failed; a proportional response; and a reasonable prospect of success. In terms of legitimate power, a prioritising of Security Council action, or at a minimum multilateral or regional action, is a central feature of modern theorising about humanitarian intervention. And yet, uncertainties surrounding the defi nition of the crime of aggression, coupled with the checkerboard jurisdictional regime, will no doubt impede coalition-building, adherence to military alliances, and other multilateral responses to global threats. Th e unequal threat of prosecution among states may give rise to diff erential tolerances for the degree of uncertainty inherent to the reach of the aggression amendments. Th e concomitant diffi culty in mobilising joint action may paradoxically lead to more unilateral actions by states not subject to the aggression amendments 50 or the moderating eff ects of joint action. Th us, the existence of the crime on the books may ultimately make multilateral action more diffi cult.
An additional requirement would be that such an intervention would result in the diminution rather than escalation of violence. Although humanitarian interventions involve armed force, one can surmise that parties engaged in just wars might ultimately produce less collateral damage than those engaged in aggressive wars due to the fact that combatants and their commanders are likely to assign diff erent values to the variables employed in the proportionality calculus (military utility and the risk of collateral harm) than their hostile adversaries. Th ese variables are elastic by design and provide a certain degree of latitude to combatants to implement military strategy. Arguably, those involved in non-hostile uses of force might demand a greater degree of military necessity to justify a course of conduct or tolerate less potential for collateral harm in choosing their targets. 51 Indeed, at the risk of melding the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum , an argument could be made that combatants engaged in a humanitarian intervention should be subject to heightened duties under humanitarian law in light of their ulterior protective purposes. 52 It is diffi cult to construct a feminist framework for humanitarian intervention on behalf of women under contemporary conditions, when women are so often excluded from decisions about uses of force. 53 Humanitarian intervention may be more palatable to feminists, and ultimately more benefi cial to women, when women are included in decision-making surrounding the propriety of military intervention, 54 as opposed to other responses, 55 as well as in the design and implementation of such operations. 56 Security Council Resolution 1325 -the fi rst thematic resolution on women, peace and security -recognised the potential for women to be peacemakers and reaffi rmed the importance of their "equal participation and full involvement in all eff orts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to confl ict prevention and resolution". 57 Resolution 1820, which supplements 1325, focuses on sexual violence and signals the Council's "readiness" to "adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systemic sexual violence". Th ese landmark resolutions indicate that such abuses fall within the Council's jurisdiction as threats to international peace and security 58 and have the potential to surpass any gravity threshold required for humanitarian action. Th e resolutions thus provide a theoretical platform with a Security Council imprimatur to integrate women and women's groups into decision-making about the propriety and execution of humanitarian intervention. 59 Th at said, empirical evidence suggests that Resolution 1325 has exerted only a modest impact on peace processes to date and that much remains to be done to fully integrate women into decision making about how to manage armed confl icts. 60 
Conclusion
If we care about what happens to women in war, we should do everything in our power to decrease the incidence of war in the fi rst place. It is too early to tell whether the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute will be able to do this. Once again, we fi nd ourselves in a reactive posture asking the 'woman question', which entails exploring the gender implications of the law 61 and engaging in a continuing task of determining how legal doctrines and institutionswhich women played little hand in constructing -aff ect women. 62 It is possible at this stage, however, to anticipate the impact that the new provisions may have on the nascent doctrine of responsibility to protect. Th is article should not be read as a ringing endorsement of humanitarian intervention, as we must remain vigilant about "the dark sides of virtue". 63 Th e codifi cation of a broad crime of aggression, with few openings to argue for the legality or legitimacy of uses of force for humanitarian purposes, certainly complicates this vital process of doctrinal development. Nonetheless, exigent threats to women's rights remain. Th is sad truth justifi es our continual work toward developing a normative and procedural framework that will allow bona fi de humanitarian interventions to proceed without threat of prosecution for the crime of aggression.
